China’s Foreign Policy: US-China interdependence and Xi Jinping’s Administration
Analytical Exam Essay (awarded First Class)
Title: Assess whether the US-China economic interdependence will affect China’s Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping’s administration
The U.S-China interdependence promises beneficial outcomes for both parties however its principles are indifferent; Trump’s Administration identifies strategic and security threats from China (Nye 2020). Built with intentions of securing trade relations, simplifying supply chains between the bilateral companies, and instilling profitable investments (Yen 2020), the U.S-China interdependence is expected to crumble. As for China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping’s Administration, scholars can observe surges in investments and economic gain.
Notably, China’s domestic affairs and policies are unfavourable — legal reformation is expected, though consequential with China’s ruling party. The Chinese Communist Party prevails with economic monopoly; notwithstanding corruption, humanitarian issues and public vexation (Jakobson 2013). Under Xi Jinping’s administration, China’s foreign policy is expected to dominate global markets and policies due to hostility (Bishop 2020). China has demonstrated aggressive pressures as mentioned by scholar, Audrye Wong:
“It [China] cancelled the visit of a trade delegation to Sweden after a Swedish literary association awarded a prize to a detained Chinese-born bookseller. The following year [2020], China retaliated against Australia’s calls for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic by imposing tariffs on a range of Australian products.” (Wong 2021).
With recent interactions observed in Australia and Sweden, it is observable that China continues to use hostility and undiplomatic means of communication for self-gain. Scholars such as Audrye Wong (2021) have raised concerns regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Business relations within BRI aspects are declared fragile due to poor quality control according to price (Wong 2021) however this appears as a feat to propagate a boost for American market economies. Xi Jinping’s Administration aspires to use the BRI to create leverage for China’s Renminbi and expand financial opportunities through a reformed Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Chatzky and McBride 2020). Currently, the BRI program has proven successful with multi billion projects and collaborations; almost ⅔ of countries have established bilateral diplomacy and relations with China’s BRI (Mauk 2019). Further expansion through maritime trade and accessibility stands as a crucial objective; to execute this BRI ambition, scholars have identified an estimated net cost of USD 1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027 (Chatzky and McBride 2020). Undoubtedly, this would benefit domestic affairs and policies. Acknowledging this information is an important anecdote as this reflects on Xi Jinping’s Administration and foreign policy planning.
In terms of foreign policy under Xi Jinping’s Administration, centralised and personalised approaches are taken to implement socialism. In other words, the 2018 Central Foreign Affairs Commission was created by Xi Jinping to maintain socialist order in policymaking (Fiddler 2021). The augmentation and enhancement of peripheral institutions encouraged improved bureaucracy; the formation of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission sets as a benchmark, surpassing the prior Leading Small Groups (Legarda 2018). Pressing domestic affairs and policies will have inevitable influence and effect on foreign affairs; most notably with the United States, North Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia (Jakobson 2013). As per domestic affairs, it undoubtedly outweighs the emphasis of foreign affairs and policies:
“Xi has drastically changed the composition of the key national and municipal leadership to include many of his confidants; significantly increased the budget to eliminate poverty in inland, rural areas; and generated policy incentives to establish “super megacities.” Li warns against underestimating Xi’s domestic power and the popular support for his foreign policy.” (Chhabra and Hass 2019).
Coordinating China’s foreign policies according to democratic expectations and liberalist norms will be unlikely. Anticipated contingencies lie in quality control, functionalities, budget allocation and bilateral memberships within BRI strategies (Legarda 2018). While China attempts to maintain and build diplomacy between other states, oppositions are expected to unravel. As witnessed with an unsuccessful bond between the Philippines and China; allyship between the Philippines and the United States is necessary for the Southeast Asian state’s survival (Grossman 2021). Misconceptions regarding the Scarborough Shoal and Whitsun Reef issues were mentioned, leading to the false accusations and social-political tension (Venzon 2021). Undoubtedly, the Philippines’ act of defaming and accusing China of poor management/handlement of the South China Sea has provoked stern hostility.
China’s handlement towards false accusations (as witnessed with Australia, Sweden and now, the Philippines) have demonstrated lack of compromise. China’s firm assertion proves centralised political control and focus for internal affairs; creating leverage for unaccounted illegal activities or behaviour that remain isolated in China (Horsley, cited in Chhabra and Hass 2019). Xi Jinping’s Administration and foreign policy remain centralised on the notion of domestic politics:
“At the same time, they crave recognition for China’s increasing contributions to global stability and prosperity. China has a dual identity, in the words of scholar Jing Men: a strange combination of self-superiority and self-inferiority. This dichotomy is evident in Chinese foreign policy thinking despite the country’s increased power and standing in the international arena.” (Jakobson 2013).
In conclusion, China’s economic monopoly will continue to prosper and surpass the United States due to their unwavering focus on domestic politics. As per foreign affairs and policies, the emphasis lies on domestic affairs; otherwise, the enhancements and further diplomatic bonds sculpted by the BRI. Xi Jinping’s Administrations have potential to revitalise the BRI holistically, further expand maritime trade routes and strategies, otherwise implement new strategic policies for economic well-being.
Full research including figures and references provided upon request: work.theababani@gmail.com
